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Chapter 3
Potential Impacts of the Great Recession
on Future Retirement Incomes
Barbara A. Butrica, Richard W. Johnson, and Karen E. Smith
The Great Recession, as many analysts dubbed the 2007–9 economic down-
turn, lived up to its name. Economic activity plummeted, millions of work-
ers lost their jobs, and unemployment soared (Elsby et al., 2010). Many
Americans were out of work for more than twelve months (Pew Economic
Policy Group, 2010), and wages stagnated for those able to keep their jobs
(Mishel and Shierholz, 2010). As incomes fell, families struggled to make
ends meet and poverty rates surged (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2010; Godofsky
et al., 2010; Hurd and Rohwedder, 2010). Declining tax revenues and
expanding public expenditures swelled the federal deficit and squeezed
state and local governments (Congressional Budget Office, 2010; McNichol
et al., 2011). Although the National Bureau of Economic Research declared
the recession is over in 2009, many analysts predict that unemployment will
stay above its pre-recession level for years (Eberts, 2011).
One result of the Great Recession is its impact on future retirees. Earlier
research showed that the 2008 stock market crash could erode retirement
security for high-income workers, most likely to hold equities (Butrica
et al., 2009, 2010). But high unemployment could reduce future retire-
ment incomes for a broader segment of the population, since in addition
to reducing earnings, job loss will lower Social Security and pension credits,
and leave workers with less income to set aside for retirement. This chapter
uses the Urban Institute’s dynamic microsimulation model (DYNASIM3)
to examine the likely impacts of the Great Recession on future retirement
incomes. The analysis projects average incomes to age 70 for adults who
were aged 25–64 in 2008, and compares them to what retirees would have
received if the recession had not occurred.
Our results show that the Great Recession will modestly reduce future
retirement incomes. This drop results almost entirely from the anemic
wage growth that occurred during the recession, which our model assumes
will permanently reduce future wages. Employment declines will have little
effect on future aggregate retirement incomes because most workers re-
mained employed during the recession, and the losses that occurred
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are generally inconsequential when averaged over decades-long careers.
Retirement incomes will fall most sharply for high-socioeconomic-status
groups, who have the most to lose, but relative income losses will not vary
much across groups. Those workers who were youngest when the recession
began will be hit hard, since they are most likely to lose their jobs, and the
impact of lower wages will accumulate over their entire careers. But retire-
ment incomes will also fall substantially for those now in their late 50s,
because the drop in the economy-wide average wage will lower the index
factor in the Social Security benefit formula, permanently reducing their
annual benefits.
Methodology
To assess the impact of the Great Recession on future retirement security,
we project incomes at age 70 for adults aged 25–64 in 2008 and compare
them to what older adults would have received had the recession not
occurred. We focus on income at age 70 because the vast majority of adults
have retired by then. The impact of high unemployment on future retire-
ment incomes will likely depend on one’s stage of the life course when
the recession hit. To capture these differences, the analysis compares out-
comes by ten-year cohorts, ranging from those aged 25–34 in 2008 (who
turn 70 between 2044 and 2053) to those aged 55–64 in 2008 (who turn
70 between 2014 and 2023).
Projections come from the Urban Institute’s Dynamic Simulation
of Income Model, known as DYNASIM3. This model starts with a self-
weighting sample of 103,072 individuals from the 1990 to 1993 panels of
the United States Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation (SIPP) and ages this starting sample in yearly increments to 2085,
using parameters estimated from longitudinal data sources. DYNASIM3
then projects demographic and economic changes annually from 1993 to
2085. The model integrates many important trends and group-level differ-
ences in life-course processes, including birth, death, schooling, leaving
home, first marriage, remarriage, divorce, disability, work, retirement, and
earnings. It projects the major sources of income and wealth annually from
age 15 until death, including employment, earnings, Social Security bene-
fits, benefits from employer-sponsored defined benefit (DB) pensions,
supplemental security income (SSI), retirement accounts (defined contri-
bution or DC plans, individual retirement accounts (IRAs), and Keoghs),
and other assets (saving, checking, money market, certificates of deposit
(CDs), stocks, bonds, equity in businesses, vehicles, and nonhome real
estate, less unsecured debt).
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We examine the impact of the Great Recession on lifetime employment
and several income measures, including own lifetime earnings, per capita
household lifetime earnings, and per capita household income at age 70.
Individuals are considered employed in a given year if they have any
earnings, even if they worked relatively few hours because they were
unemployed for part of the year. (The Social Security Trustees follow
the same convention when setting their employment targets.) As a result,
employment rates calculated in DYNASIM3 do not match those from
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which are annual averages of monthly
employment.1 Own lifetime earnings are reported in 2010 dollars and
averaged from ages 22 to 62. Per capita household earnings, which we
term ‘shared lifetime earnings’, are computed as half of the husband’s
and wife’s earnings in years when an individual is married and own
earnings in years when single. As with own lifetime earnings, shared
lifetime earnings are indexed to 2010 dollars and averaged from ages 22
to 62. Both measures include years with zero earnings. Per capita house-
hold income includes all income received by the individual and spouse,
divided by 2 if married. It excludes income of other household members.
Because income and asset distributions are highly skewed, we drop indi-
viduals in the top 1 percent of the income distribution to lessen the
impact of these outliers on reported means. All financial amounts are
reported in constant 2010 dollars (adjusted by the projected change in
the consumer price index).
Our baseline simulation uses the Social Security Trustees’ 2010 assump-
tions (Social Security Board of Trustees, 2010), which account for the
actual and projected effects of high unemployment and lower wages from
the Great Recession. Our alternative scenario, designed to simulate out-
comes if the recession had not occurred, is based largely on the Trustees’
2008 assumptions (Social Security Board of Trustees, 2008). One compli-
cation is that some differences between the 2008 and 2010 Trustees’
assumptions were unrelated to the recession. For example, the Trustees
changed their assumptions about mortality and immigration after 2008.
They also increased their long-range real wage growth assumptions from
1.1 to 1.2 percent per year, because the Affordable Care Act, signed by
President Obama in March 2010, is expected to reduce employers’ health
care spending and boost earnings. To isolate the changes in the Trustees’
assumptions between 2008 and 2010 related to the recession, we use
adjusted 2008 targets in the no-recession simulation. That simulation uses
the employment and disability onset rates from 2008 and assumes that real
wages grow at the 2008 assumed rate through 2010, after which they grow at
the higher rates assumed by the Trustees in 2010. Both the baseline and no-
recession simulations, then, capture the expected impact of health reform
on projected wage growth. The no-recession scenario also uses the 2008
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price growth series through 2010 and aligns price growth with the 2010
assumptions for later years.2 As a result, the no-recession simulation in-
cludes permanently higher average earnings and price targets than the
baseline simulation in all years after 2007. All other parameters in the no-
recession simulation rely on the 2010 Trustees’ assumptions.
Findings
Figure 3.1 shows actual and projected employment rates for persons aged
16–64 under the baseline scenario, where the impact of the Great Reces-
sion is evident. Employment rates fall from 82 to 75 percent for men and
from 77 to 71 percent for women between 2007 and 2010. After 2010,
employment rates are projected to gradually recover, stabilizing at about
80 percent for men and 74 percent for women in 2016.
Figure 3.2 shows projected labor earnings paths for the two scenarios, in
2010 dollars. Real earnings fall between 2007 and 2009 in the baseline
scenario, but then grow at about 2 percent per year in the no-recession
scenario. By the time earnings growth rates converge again in the
two scenarios in 2010, average real earnings in the no-recession scenario
exceed those in the baseline scenario by 6 percent, a differential that
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Figure 3.1 Employment rate of men and women aged 16–64: 1993–2035
Source : Authors’ calculations from data provided by the Social Security Board of Trustees
(2008, 2010).
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persists throughout the projection period. The absolute value of the real
wage differential in the two scenarios grows from about $2,700 in 2010 to
$3,200 in 2020 to $3,600 in 2030. The projected price targets do not differ
much between the two scenarios.
The recession’s impact on employment
Table 3.1 shows simulated employment rates in 2010 when actual unem-
ployment peaked under the baseline scenario, and the absolute and
percentage change relative to the no-recession scenario. In 2010, we
estimate that 71.1 percent of 25–64-year-olds were working (had earnings),
3.4 percentage points (4.6 percent) below the share that would have
been employed had the recession not occurred. The hardest hits were
the 35–44-year-olds, whose employment rate declined by 3.9 percentage
points (5 percent). In contrast, the 55–64-year-olds were least affected.
Because older workers were less likely to lose their jobs than younger
workers during the Great Recession (as in previous recessions) (Johnson
and Mommaerts, 2011; Johnson and Park, 2011), their employment rate
declined by only 2.5 percentage points (4 percent). Men, blacks, Hispanics,
those who did not complete high school, and those with intermittent
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Figure 3.2 Average earnings of workers by simulation in $ 2010: 2005–30
Source : Authors’ calculations from data provided by the Social Security Board of Trustees
(2008, 2010).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi
40 Reshaping Retirement Security
T
a
b
le
3
.1
E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t
ra
te
s
in
20
10
,
ad
u
lt
s
ag
ed
25
–6
4
E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t
ra
te
(%
)
A
b
so
lu
te
ch
an
ge
d
u
e
to
re
ce
ss
io
n
P
er
ce
n
t
ch
an
ge
d
u
e
to
re
ce
ss
io
n
A
ge
in
20
08
25
–3
4
35
–4
4
45
–5
4
55
–6
4
25
–3
4
35
–4
4
45
–5
4
55
–6
4
25
–3
4
35
–4
4
45
–5
4
55
–6
4
Ye
ar
ag
e
70
A
ll
20
44
–5
3
20
34
–4
3
20
24
–3
3
20
14
–2
3
A
ll
20
44
–5
3
20
34
–4
3
20
24
–3
3
20
14
–2
3
A
ll
20
44
–5
3
20
34
–4
3
20
24
–3
3
20
14
–2
3
A
ll
71
.1
74
.1
73
.8
74
.7
59
.8
3
.4
**
*
3
.7
**
*
3
.9
**
*
3
.3
**
*
2
.5
**
*
4
.6
4
.8
5
.0
4
.2
4
.0
G
en
d
er
F
em
al
e
67
.8
70
.7
71
.2
72
.6
54
.5
2
.5
**
*
2
.9
**
*
3
.0
**
*
1
.9
**
*
2
.1
**
3
.6
3
.9
4
.0
2
.6
3
.7
M
al
e
74
.8
77
.8
76
.4
77
.0
65
.9
4
.4
**
*
4
.4
**
*
4
.9
**
*
4
.9
**
*
3
.0
**
*
5
.6
5
.4
6
.0
6
.0
4
.4
R
ac
e/
et
h
n
ic
it
y
N
o
n
-H
is
p
an
ic
w
h
it
e
75
.3
79
.8
78
.1
78
.8
63
.6
3
.3
**
*
3
.8
**
*
3
.9
**
*
3
.1
**
*
2
.4
**
*
4
.2
4
.5
4
.8
3
.8
3
.6
N
o
n
-H
is
p
an
ic
b
la
ck
67
.2
78
.0
73
.9
68
.5
38
.3
4
.0
**
*
2
.9
**
4
.4
**
*
4
.7
**
*
4
.1
*
5
.6
3
.6
5
.6
6
.4
9
.7
H
is
p
an
ic
58
.2
60
.3
59
.0
58
.1
51
.5
3
.9
**
*
4
.3
**
*
4
.4
**
*
4
.2
**
1
.6
6
.3
6
.7
6
.9
6
.7
3
.0
A
si
an
/
n
at
iv
e
A
m
er
ic
an
62
.6
59
.8
64
.3
67
.6
59
.0
2
.4
**
2
.5
2
.2
2
.3
2
.8
3
.7
4
.0
3
.3
3
.3
4
.5
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
D
id
n
o
t
co
m
p
le
te
h
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
38
.9
42
.6
40
.4
38
.7
33
.3
4
.2
**
*
5
.2
**
*
4
.7
**
*
4
.8
**
*
1
.5
9
.7
1
0.
9
1
0.
4
1
1.
0
4
.3
H
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
gr
ad
u
at
e/
so
m
e
co
ll
eg
e
71
.1
75
.4
74
.1
75
.5
57
.3
3
.7
**
*
3
.9
**
*
4
.3
**
*
3
.7
**
*
2
.8
**
*
4
.9
4
.9
5
.5
4
.7
 4
.7
C
o
ll
eg
e
gr
ad
u
at
e
83
.1
82
.4
84
.9
87
.7
75
.8
2
.5
**
*
2
.9
**
*
2
.8
**
*
1
.8
**
2
.4
**
2
.9
3
.4
3
.2
2
.0
3
.1
Ye
ar
s
w
o
rk
ed
fr
o
m
ag
e
15
th
ro
u
gh
20
10
1
0
35
.0
44
.9
29
.2
22
.6
18
.9
3
.0
**
*
3
.9
**
*
2
.5
**
2
.3
0
.8
7
.9
8
.0
7
.9
9
.2
4
.1
11
–2
9
77
.2
89
.1
81
.5
63
.4
36
.8
3
.7
**
*
3
.2
**
*
4
.0
**
*
4
.5
**
*
2
.4
*
4
.6
3
.5
4
.7
6
.6
6
.1
30
+
81
.6
0.
0
96
.5
90
.3
71
.1
2
.6
**
*
0.
0
2
.4
**
*
2
.6
**
*
2
.7
**
*
3
.1
–
2
.4
2
.8
3
.7
(C
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi
T
a
b
le
3
.1
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t
ra
te
(%
)
A
b
so
lu
te
ch
an
ge
d
u
e
to
re
ce
ss
io
n
P
er
ce
n
t
ch
an
ge
d
u
e
to
re
ce
ss
io
n
A
ge
in
20
08
25
–3
4
35
–4
4
45
–5
4
55
–6
4
25
–3
4
35
–4
4
45
–5
4
55
–6
4
25
–3
4
35
–4
4
45
–5
4
55
–6
4
Ye
ar
ag
e
70
A
ll
20
44
–5
3
20
34
–4
3
20
24
–3
3
20
14
–2
3
A
ll
20
44
–5
3
20
34
–4
3
20
24
–3
3
20
14
–2
3
A
ll
20
44
–5
3
20
34
–4
3
20
24
–3
3
20
14
–2
3
O
w
n
li
fe
ti
m
e
ea
rn
in
gs
q
u
in
ti
le
B
o
tt
o
m
29
.9
28
.7
31
.2
33
.2
25
.5
2
.7
**
*
2
.9
**
3
.1
**
3
.2
**
1
.4
8
.3
9
.2
9
.0
8
.8
5
.2
Se
co
n
d
69
.3
75
.7
72
.2
74
.3
51
.9
4
.5
**
*
5
.4
**
*
5
.6
**
*
3
.5
**
*
2
.9
**
6
.1
6
.7
7
.2
4
.5
5
.3
T
h
ir
d
79
.7
84
.3
83
.1
83
.1
65
.8
3
.7
**
*
3
.8
**
*
4
.3
**
*
4
.0
**
*
2
.0
4
.4
4
.3
4
.9
4
.6
2
.9
F
o
u
rt
h
86
.1
89
.5
89
.9
89
.4
73
.3
3
.2
**
*
3
.0
**
*
3
.0
**
*
3
.2
**
*
3
.5
**
*
3
.6
3
.2
3
.2
3
.5
4
.6
T
o
p
90
.6
92
.5
92
.6
93
.4
82
.4
3
.0
**
*
3
.1
**
*
3
.4
**
*
2
.7
**
*
2
.8
**
*
3
.2
3
.2
 3
.5
2
.8
3
.3
N
ot
es
:*
**
Si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
1%
le
ve
l;
**
at
5%
le
ve
l;
*
at
10
%
le
ve
l.
Sa
m
p
le
ex
cl
u
d
es
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s
w
it
h
in
co
m
es
in
th
e
to
p
1
p
er
ce
n
t
o
f
th
e
in
co
m
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
.Y
ea
rs
w
o
rk
ed
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
ye
ar
s
w
it
h
p
o
si
ti
ve
ea
rn
in
gs
fr
o
m
ag
e
15
th
ro
u
gh
20
10
.
O
w
n
li
fe
ti
m
e
ea
rn
in
gs
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
o
f
w
ag
e-
in
d
ex
ed
ea
rn
in
gs
fr
o
m
ag
e
15
u
n
ti
l
20
10
.
Q
u
in
ti
le
s
ar
e
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
w
it
h
in
ag
e
gr
o
u
p
s.
So
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
rs
’
co
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s
fr
o
m
D
YN
A
SI
M
3
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
s.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi
employment histories and lower wages were generally hit harder by the
recession than others. In the youngest age group, employment rates fell by
10.9 percent for those lacking high school diplomas, but only 3.4 percent
for college graduates.
Projecting outcomes to age 70 shows the effects of the recession com-
pounded over a lifetime. Although employment rates fell by 3.4 percentage
points in 2010—at the peak of the downturn in the labor market—most
workers retained their jobs or received at least some earnings in the year
they became unemployed. As a result, the average number of years worked
between ages 22 and 62 is projected to decline by less than 1 percent for
all cohorts (Table 3.2). Among the youngest age group, 66 percent are
projected to work 30 or more years over their lifetimes. This share is only
0.5 percentage points below what it would have been had the recession not
occurred. The recession will have very little impact on lifetime work years
for those closest to retirement when the downturn began.
Projected incomes for future retirees
Although the Great Recession will not shorten worklives, it is projected to
reduce average own lifetime earnings by 3.4 percent, because the economic
downturn interrupted the growth in hourly wages (Table 3.3). The impact
will be greater for workers who were relatively young in 2008 and will spend
much of their careers in the new, lower-wage labor market, and smaller for
older workers, who will spend few years in the less-inviting labor market.
For example, the recession will reduce average own lifetime earnings 4.8
percent for those aged 25–34 in 2008, but only 0.7 percent for those aged 55–
64. Results are similar for husbands’ and wives’ shared lifetime earnings.
Our projections also indicate that the recession will reduce Social Secur-
ity benefits in two ways. Because benefits are based on the average highest
thirty-five years of earnings, the decline in annual earnings after 2008 will
directly reduce future benefits. Benefits will receive an additional hit
because they are indexed to the economy-wide average earnings in the
year the beneficiary turns age 60. Strong growth in average wages before
age 60 raises future Social Security benefits, even for those whose own
wages did not increase much, because the indexing means that all earnings
received before age 60 count more in the benefit formula than they would
if average wages grew more slowly. Our baseline scenario assumes that the
recession will permanently reduce earnings after 2008, in turn reducing
the index factor in the Social Security benefit formula for everyone who
turns 60 after 2008. As a result, future Social Security benefits will generally
decline more sharply than lifetime earnings, especially for those approach-
ing age 60 in 2008. Average own Social Security benefits will drop
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1.4 percent for those aged 55–64 in 2008, and 3.8 percent for those aged
45–54, or about twice the decline in lifetime earnings.3 For those aged
25–34, who will spend almost their entire careers in the postrecession labor
market, the percentage decline in Social Security benefits roughly equals
the percentage decline in lifetime earnings.
The recession will also affect other sources of retirement income outside
of Social Security. Lower earnings will reduce wealth in employer retire-
ment plans and limit workers’ ability to save outside of them. Unemployed
workers may be forced to dip into their retirement savings at relatively
young ages to meet current consumption needs. Moreover, the recession
will curtail postretirement earnings.
Table 3.4 reports projected average per capita household income at
age 70. We suggest that the recession will reduce annual household income
by 4.1 percent (or $2,100 per person in 2010 dollars) for those closest to
retirement when the recession hit, and by 4.9 percent (or $3,200 per
person) for those farthest from retirement. For those aged 55–64 in 2008,
average retirement incomes will drop more steeply than average Social
Security benefits, primarily because their age-70 earnings will fall 9 percent
and their income from assets outside of pension and retirement plans will
fall 4.7 percent. Earnings at age 70 will drop so much for this age group
because many lost their jobs late in life and will never become reemployed.
We project that the recession will reduce age-70 employment rates by 2.3
percentage points for those aged 55–64 in 2008, but by only 0.2 percentage
points for later cohorts (not shown). Wealth outside of pension plans falls
for those near retirement when the recession hit, because the recession
forced many to dip into their savings to meet current consumption needs,
and they have little time to recoup their lost savings. For the youngest
adults in 2008, the recession depresses overall retirement income by
about the same percentage as Social Security benefits.
The recession’s impact on income sources is projected to vary across the
income distribution. Retirees in the bottom income quintile receive most
of their household income (around 71 percent) from Social Security
benefits. As a result, the projected drop in Social Security benefits for
these retirees’ accounts for nearly the entire decline in their age-70
income. By contrast, retirees in the top income quintile receive relatively
little of their household income (around 16 percent) from Social Security
benefits, so the projected benefit decline explains only part of their total
income losses. Although they will receive more Social Security benefits than
lower income retirees (despite the program’s progressivity) and the reces-
sion will reduce their benefits more, this cut will account for only about
16 percent of the total income decline (averaged across all cohorts).
Instead, the projected decline in household income for the highest income
retirees is driven mostly by drops in income from nonpension assets and
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi
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earnings at age 70. For the youngest age group, 38 percent of their pro-
jected total loss is in nonpension asset income and 20 percent is in earn-
ings. For the oldest age group, 41 percent of their projected total loss is in
nonpension asset income and 44 percent is in earnings.
The recession-induced decline in household income is also projected to
increase the number of Americans living in or near poverty at age 70.
Table 3.5 reports the number and percentage of adults surviving to age
70 with incomes below 100 and 125 percent of the federal poverty level
(FPL). We focus on those below the higher threshold because many with
incomes that slightly exceed the FPL struggle financially (Zedlewski and
Butrica, 2008). Moreover, the official poverty measure does not fully cap-
ture households’ health care spending needs, a particularly pressing con-
cern for many older Americans. The National Academy of Sciences
developed a revised poverty threshold that better accounts for out-of-
pocket spending (Citro and Michael, 1995). The 2009 poverty rate for
adults aged 65 and older under this revised measure was about equal to
the share with incomes below 125 percent of the official poverty threshold,
suggesting that 125 percent of the FPL is an appropriate indicator for
financial hardship at older ages (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2010; Short, 2010).
Across the four cohorts, the share of adults projected to have incomes
below 125 percent of the FPL at age 70 will increase 7.4 percent because of
the recession. The impact will grow over time, increasing 6.2 percent for
those closest to retirement in 2008 and 9.6 percent for the youngest group.
Among those aged 25–64 in 2008, the recession will leave an additional
711,000 adults with incomes below 125 percent of the FPL.4
Variation in projected outcomes by
individual characteristics
Table 3.6 shows how the recession’s impact on average per capita house-
hold income at age 70 is projected to vary across the population. Although
employment rates fell most dramatically during the recession among those
with the least education and earnings, these groups are unlikely to experi-
ence the sharpest declines in future retirement incomes. In absolute terms,
incomes at age 70 will fall most for those with the highest incomes, who
have most to lose. In relative terms, however, high-socioeconomic-status
groups will not lose much more income than less privileged groups,
because the large absolute losses for affluent groups represent only a
small share of their total income. Within the youngest age group, the
recession will reduce age-70 incomes for the highest income retirees by
4.7 percent, compared with 3.5 percent for the lowest income retirees.
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Although, the recession will cut future incomes for high-socioeconomic-
status groups, they will remain much better off than others.
Differential survival mutes the observed variation in retirement incomes
at age 70. Table 3.7 shows survival rates by employment status. Among men
aged 45–54 in 2008, 85.5 percent of those who worked every year between
2008 and 2013 will survive to age 70, compared with only 73.6 percent
of those with at least one year of zero earnings during that period—about a
12 percentage point difference. These results suggest that the impact of the
recession would be even worse had these individuals survived to age 70.
Additionally, we would likely observe more significant effects for the reces-
sion if we compared retirement outcomes at younger ages.
Conclusion
Our projections indicate that the Great Recession, by many measures the
most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression, will modestly
reduce future retirement incomes for today’s workers. Workers unem-
ployed for many months accumulate fewer Social Security and employer-
sponsored pension credits, and are less able to contribute to retirement
accounts or save in other ways. Most workers, however, remained employed
during the recession, and the reduction in work years for those who lost
their jobs was generally inconsequential when averaged over decades-long
careers. More important for future retirement incomes is the wage stagna-
tion that the recession triggered, since people can never make up lost
wages. Lower wage growth affects nearly all workers, not just the relatively
few who lost their jobs. Our results show that average age-70 incomes for
those aged 25–64 when the recession began will fall 4.3 percent from the
levels that would have prevailed had the recession not occurred, almost
entirely because of the long-term reduction in wages.
Unemployment rates rose sharply during the recession for workers with
limited education, yet the recession will not disproportionately reduce
their retirement incomes. Because lower-socioeconomic-status groups are
less likely to have pensions or to accumulate significant retirement savings
even in good times, they had less to lose. The most disadvantaged are also
less likely to survive into old age. Low-income and less-educated workers
have certainly suffered during the recession, with unemployment leaving
many impoverished. And even modest retirement income losses could
significantly reduce their economic well-being in later life, because their
resources are so limited even in the absence of the recession. Nonetheless,
retirement incomes will fall most sharply for well-educated, high-income
workers, the same groups that have borne the brunt of the stock market
crash associated with the financial crisis (Butrica et al., 2009, 2010).
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Projecting incomes over the next forty years involves much uncertainty,
and future developments could lead to outcomes very different from our
forecasts. Retirement projections are more certain for those who were in
their late 50s when the recession began. The recession will undoubtedly
reduce their Social Security income because the index factor in the benefit
formula is lower today than it would have been had the recession not
occurred. Moreover, those older workers who lost their jobs in the reces-
sion have limited employment prospects and little chance of extending
their working lives. Unlike workers who were young when the recession hit,
and have years to adjust before retiring, there is little older workers who can
do to offset their recession-induced losses.
Appendix
This appendix provides additional information about how the DYNASIM3
model projects employment, earnings, pensions, retirement accounts,
other assets, and income.
Employment and earnings. DYNASIM3 projects the likelihood that an
individual works each year as a function of age, sex, race and ethnicity,
education, health and disability status, geographic region, marital status,
student status, number of young children, spouse characteristics (employ-
ment, age, disability, and education), immigrant status, Social Security
benefit status, cohort, and the state-specific unemployment rate. The like-
lihood also includes an estimated individual-specific error term that cap-
tures nonvarying individual preferences that are independent of observed
characteristics. The model classifies an individual as employed if his or
her expected probability of working exceeds a given random number. The
selection criteria are adjusted so that our employment projections for men
and women within particular age groups hit the Social Security Trustees’
targets.5
DYNASIM3 uses a similar set of explanatory variables to assign hourly
wages and annual hours of employment to those projected to work. Annual
earnings are the product of the hourly wage and annual hours worked.
DYNASIM3 adjusts the underlying predicted annual wage for real wage
growth based on the Trustees’ economic assumptions. It also aligns the
annual earnings of workers to hit the Trustees’ annual earnings targets.
Pensions. DYNASIM3 projects pensions from employer-sponsored DB
plans, cash balance (CB) plans, and retirement accounts. Information
about pension coverage on current and past jobs, pension contribution
rates, and account balances come from SIPP self-reported information.
Projected DB pension information reflects plan structures through
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December 2008, including DB pension plan freezes and conversions to CB
plans. Various data sources and models described below are used to project
job changes, pension coverage, pension participation, and pension con-
tributions into the future.
DYNASIM3 projects DB pensions using the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation’s (PBGC) Pension Insurance Modeling System (PIMS) DB
plan formulas, which are randomly assigned to DB participants based on
broad industry, union status, and firm size categories, and are an indicator
of whether the firm offers dual (DB and DC) coverage. The model uses
actual benefit formulas to calculate benefits for federal government work-
ers and military personnel, and uses tables of replacement rates from BLS
to calculate replacement rates for state and local government workers. The
model also varies the probability of selecting a joint and survivor annuity by
gender, education, family health status, wealth, and expected pension
income. It also varies DB cost-of-living adjustments by employment sector
(i.e. private, federal, state, and local). The model projects conversions of
pension plan type (from DB to CB or DB to DC) using actual plan change
information for plans included in the PIMS data.
Most DB plan formulas assign DB pension income as a function of plan
earnings and job tenure. Most private pensions require five years of
employment before workers are vested in the DB plan. Any shortening of
job tenure directly reduces expected DB pension income.
Retirement accounts. DYNASIM3 starts with the self-reported SIPP retire-
ment account balance. Because of documented deficiencies in the SIPP
asset data (Czajka et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2005), asset balances in retire-
ment accounts (as well as financial assets outside of retirement accounts) in
the starting SIPP sample are adjusted to align with asset distributions from
the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Individuals are also assigned
an individual-specific risk tolerance based on SCF data. An individual’s
share of retirement account assets invested in equities varies by age and
risk tolerance, with high-risk and younger individuals investing more in
equities than low-risk and older individuals.
The model uses historical price changes and returns for stocks, long-
term corporate bonds, and long-term government bonds through 2008 to
grow portfolios. Investment experience varies for each individual because
the model sets rates of return stochastically, using historical means and
standard deviations. We account for the 2008 stock market crash, which
reduced equity values by 37 percent, by assuming that the market recovers
to half of its projected precrash value by 2017 (Butrica et al., 2010). Specifi-
cally, the model assumes a 10.7 percent average real rate of return on stocks
from 2009 to 2017 before resuming its historic average real return of 6.5
percent. DYNASIM3 assumes mean real rates of return of 3.5 percent for
corporate bonds, 3 percent for government bonds, and standard deviations
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of 17.28 percent for stocks and 2.14 percent for bonds.6 The 6.5 percent
real return on stocks reflects a capital appreciation of about 3.5 percent
and a dividend yield of around 3 percent, in line with the long-term
performance of the S&P 500. The model subtracts 1 percentage point
from annual stock and bond returns to reflect administrative costs.
The model allows some workers to cash out retirement account balances
with job changes or job losses. Younger workers, workers with lower
account balances, and workers who lose their jobs are more likely to cash
out retirement account balances than are older workers, those with higher
balances, and those who stay on their jobs or move seamlessly from one job
to another. High unemployment contributes to lower lifetime DC pension
savings through lost contributions (and returns on lost contributions)
when out of work and to hardship withdrawals.
Financial assets. The model uses random-effects models to project finan-
cial assets. DYNASIM3 starts with SIPP self-reported financial assets (saving,
checking, money market, and certificate of deposit balances, stocks, bonds,
equity in businesses, vehicles, and nonhome real estate, less unsecured
debt). We adjust the SIPP starting values to align with the household
asset distribution from the 2007 SCF. Unlike retirement accounts that are
directly invested in stock and bond portfolios, financial assets accumulate
and decumulate as a function of family characteristics and earnings and
projected wage differentials. The main economic explanatory variable is
individual lifetime earnings relative to the cohort average. Individuals
with above-average lifetime earnings accumulate assets faster than those
with below-average lifetime earnings. A spell of unemployment will lower a
worker’s average compared with one who remains employed continuously.
The longer the unemployment spell, the greater is the differential in
lifetime earnings relative to the cohort average and the greater is the
impact on projected assets. Assets accumulate at the family level, so hus-
bands and wives equally share family assets. We assume that couples split
assets at divorce and survivors inherit the assets of deceased spouses.
The model projects nonpension financial assets over three separate
age ranges: up to age 50, from age 51 to retirement, and from retirement
to death. Equations projecting assets to age 50 were estimated on the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) (Toder et al., 2002). Equa-
tions projecting assets from age 51 to retirement were estimated on the
first seven waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) (Smith et al.,
2007). Equations projecting assets from retirement to death were estimated
on a synthetic panel of SIPP data (Toder et al., 1999). The latter two data
sets included historic earnings from the Social Security Administration’s
Summary Earnings Record (SER) data.
Other income sources. DYNASIM3 projects income from various other
sources to generate a measure of total household income. Social Security
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income is computed based on the benefit formula, projected lifetime
earnings, and an equation projecting benefit take-up. SSI is also computed
using benefit formulas that vary by state. The model projects SSI eligibility
based on age, disability, family income, and assets. It then projects partici-
pation based on family characteristics and benefit size.
The model computes income from retirement accounts and financial
assets each year as the real (price indexed), actuarially fair, annuity
income a family would receive if it annuitized 80 percent of its total
wealth. We use the calculated annuity value to assign only that year’s
income from retirement accounts and financial assets. The annuity factor
is recalculated each year to reflect changes in wealth as individuals age,
based on the projections of wealth accumulation and spend-down and
changes in life expectancy and marital status as individuals survive to
older ages. For married couples, the model assumes a 50 percent survivor
annuity.
We measure income from financial wealth and retirement accounts as
potential annuities to ensure comparability with DB pension and Social
Security benefits, which are also annuities. Without this adjustment, the
model would overstate the loss in retirement well-being from the shift from
DB pension income to DC assets. A dollar in DB pension wealth produces
more income by standard measures than a dollar in DC wealth because
measured DB income counts both a return on accumulated assets and
some return of principal, while measured income from financial wealth
and DC retirement accounts includes only the return on accumulated
assets. The income measure we use therefore differs conceptually from
asset income as measured by the United States Census Bureau (as well as
many analysts), which includes only the return on assets (interest, divi-
dends, and rental income) and excludes the potential consumption of
capital that could be realized if people spent down their wealth.
The model also projects income of nonspouse family members. We use
this income primarily for determining poverty status, as these family mem-
bers’ incomes and characteristics are included in the standard poverty
measure. We include spousal income in our measure of family income
but exclude incomes of other family members in this report.
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Endnotes
1. Another difference is that the DYNASIM3 model includes institutionalized
adults, overseas military personnel, and residents of US territories, whereas the
Bureau of Labor Statistics uses the civilian noninstitutionalized US resident
population.
2. The underlying price and wage targets affect various other projections, including
the Social Security wage base (the taxable maximum), the indexing of wages for
the calculation of Social Security benefits (AIME and PIA), SSI benefit para-
meters, stock and bond rates of return, and interest rates. Changes in economic
conditions also affect retirement and Social Security benefit claiming, as well as
marriage, divorce, fertility, and schooling outcomes.
3. Some people in the oldest age group turned 60 before 2008. The recession will
not affect their Social Security benefits much.
4. Poverty rates projected in the DYNASIM3 model are lower than the official
poverty rates calculated by the Census Bureau because DYNASIM3 includes the
annuitized value of 80 percent of household assets in the income measure. The
Census income measure includes only the return on capital (dividend, interest,
and rental income). See the Appendix for more details.
5. The random error term follows an autoregressive (AR1) process so that random
shocks include both a current and lagged effect.
6. The assumed rates of return are those recommended by the Social Security
Administration’s Office of the Chief Actuary for the President’s Commission to
Strengthen Social Security (President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Secur-
ity, 2001). The standard deviations are derived from real returns over the 55-year
period between 1952 and 2007 for large company stocks and Treasury bills
reported in Ibbotson Associates (2008). Inflation assumptions follow the 2010
intermediate assumptions used by the Social Security Trustees (Social Security
Board of Trustees, 2010).
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